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The Partition of Ireland: Anglo-Irish Relations as Reflected in a Political Idea
In June of 2016, a British referendum decided that Britain would leave the European
Union, and with it would go the six counties of Northern Ireland. After years of postponement,
and at the time of writing, Britain is set to leave the European Union on December 31, 2020,
after complications mainly due to the new-age “Irish Question:'' how to handle the border
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland in the south? The reemergence of a hard
political border seems to be a likely possibility for Ireland, which would be devastating to both
Irish and British societies and economies with increased political violence, and the imposition of
new trade customs in the North.
This “Irish Backstop” as Brexit politicians have coined it, continues to plague the Brexit
process, and its effects can be seen across all of Ireland with a sharp increase in political support
for the historic nationalistic Sinn Féin party, both North and South. Following the uncertainty of
what Brexit has in store for the North, particularly regarding the border, a resurgence of partisan
violence is occuring in the North, something which the Irish are all too familiar with by this
point. Brexit is the latest thorn in the side of Anglo-Irish relations, and not since the Troubles of
the late twentieth century has Ireland stood to be so divided. Britain leaving the EU puts the
sovereignty of Northern Ireland in question, as the 2016 referendum stands to invalidate crucial
elements of the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, which ended the Troubles. Anglo-Irish
relations are again deteriorating, and to understand current Anglo-Irish relations related to the
border issue between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, in the context of Brexit, it is
first necessary to gain a better understanding of the origins of that border.
Many Irish are governed by the old adage ‘whatever you say, say nothing,’ born from a
long history of oppression and abuse. In other words, topics that make one uncomfortable need
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not be talked about. For this reason, partition as a topic sits on the periphery of modern Irish
popular discourse, though it singularly defines Irish experiences throughout the twentieth
century. The border in the North is not yet 100 years old, but has affected tremendously modern
Irish history, and facilitates the deterioration of Anglo-Irish relations. Implemented officially in
1925, the Irish partition separates the six Northern counties of Antrim, Armagh, Derry, Down,
Fermanagh, and Tyrone from the remaining 26 counties of the Republic of Ireland. The
seemingly arbitrary demarcation follows no geographic landmarks, bisects roughly 270 public
roads, and in some areas divided homes along the border, which led to some interesting and
unfortunate run-ins with authorities on both sides of the border.
These counties were left out of the legislation which established the Irish Free State due
to a complex minority issue: Protestants centered in the North perceived to be under attack by the
Catholic masses attempting to form a government outside of the United Kingdom. This led to
bitter contestation of the border between those who wished to dismantle it, and those who sought
to defend it, with partisan violence plaguing Catholic and Protestant communities surrounding
and within the border. This thesis brings partition to the front of an increasingly dynamic modern
Irish history by tracing the idea of partition as a viable solution to the ever-changing “Irish
Question” from its inception to its implementation. I will explore the complexity of the minority
issues within Ireland, as well as explaining how Anglo-Irish relations deteriorated from the Act
of Union of 1800, to the official partitioning of Ireland in 1925.
An analysis of legislation and newspaper articles about the Home Rule Movement during
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries shows the evolution of partitioning Ireland moving from
an idea to a reality. British parliamentary debates show the development of the several
Government of Ireland (Home Rule) Bills, which later established the partition of Ireland as it
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stands today. Finally, both British parliamentary and Dáil Éireann debates over the Anglo-Irish
Treaty (1921), which ended the Irish War for Independence and reaffirmed a partitioned Ireland,
demonstrated the real points of contention among all political sects involved. All of this helps
show how partitioning Ireland came to fruition as a British decision accepted by the Irish, in
hopes of someday unifying their island. Tuning in to the historiography of the partition of Ireland
generated a strong foundation upon which I launched my research. The long discussion of the
Irish partition ranges from the nationalistic fervor of outright blaming Britain for
“dismembering”1 Ireland, to a more objective approach to how the inevitability of partition could
not be avoided. Though as the publishing dates of the literature increases, so too does the
objectivity of the discussion.
Published in the midst of the Irish Repeblican Army (IRA) Border Campaign in 1957,
Frank Gallagher’s The Indivisible Island ironically starts by explaining how the Irish have
seldom been a united people, and that England has had a large role in this. Gallagher, a former
IRA volunteer, explains that British Conservatives used the idea of partition as a political plaything to hinder Liberal efforts to grant Ireland Home Rule. Conservatives, such as the British
Tory and Unionist parties, made the demand of a partitioned Ireland knowing that Nationalists
and Liberals would never concede to such an idea. But to Gallagher, even entertaining the idea
that partition was necessary or inevitable, as some historians continue to do, is “unjust” and
“absurd.”2 Gallagher claims that a national Irish (Catholic) government could protect and cherish
Protestant interests. However, one can speculate just how protected these interests would be in a
new nation where the Catholic clergy heavily influenced the state legislature for the decades
presiding over Partition. For a man who spent many long stints behind bars for IRA activity, he
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must not have noticed how quickly Home Rule became ‘Rome’ Rule in the years following
Partition. Nonetheless, Gallagher’s work influenced many Irish historians, politicians, and social
activists of the twentieth century.
By the 1980s, historians had dug deeper into the divide as social tensions in Ireland,
particularly in the province of Ulster, continued to flare between the Irish and British during the
three decades known as the Troubles, 1969-1998. Published during the Troubles in 1983, Irish
historian Michael Laffan’s The Partition of Ireland analyzes the social differences between the
province of Ulster and the rest of Ireland. A more even-handed approach to a very sensitive topic
at the time, Laffan explains that partition was a solution, one of many, to a centuries-old conflict
between two separate ‘nations’ in Ireland. 3 Ulster has always been different from the rest of
Ireland, most notably in the post-colonial English rule where it colloquially became known as a
British, Protestant stronghold. Ulster maintained its connection to Britain via plantation efforts
and Protestant Scottish lowland migrations, which helped to further distinguish itself from the
rest of Ireland as predominantly British (Protestant).
Published in the wake of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, English historian Thomas
Hennessey’s Dividing Ireland maintains the two-nationalities theory, claiming partition was
inevitable as there were two distinct Irish nationalities in Ireland. This seems to be widely
accepted as the end result for partition debates, as academics in recent years have turned to face
the economic and social repercussions of a divided Ireland. Ultimately, partition boiled down to
political decisions made by both British and Irish politicians during the tumultuous years that
encompassed World War One. Hennessey undoubtedly proved the transformative powers of
World War One on Irish nationalism, which encompassed the Dublin Easter Rising of 1916. He
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explains how Irish Nationalists moved from seeking a devolved form of government within the
United Kingdom in 1914 to determinedly pursuing a free Irish Republic outside of the British
Empire by 1918.
There is one indisputable factor that is thematic throughout the discussion of Anglo-Irish
relations in regard to partition: by the twentieth century, Ulster was profoundly different from the
rest of Ireland, and social, sectarian, and political divides between Ulster and the rest of Ireland
persist into the present. The existence of this divide is centuries old and stems from the Norman
invasions of the 1100s, but more prominently the Cromwellian conquest of Ireland in the mid
1600s, in which Oliver Cromwell hacked his way across Ireland mythically coining the slogan,
‘to Hell or to Connacht’ as he drove Irish Catholics in Ulster to the barren and boggy hinterlands.
In Cromwell’s wake, a flood of lowland Protestant Scots entered Ulster with the support of the
Elizabethan plantation schemes, ensuring Protestants owned the most valuable land in Ireland.
This cemented the divide that would come in later years to be the backbone of Irish Nationalist
opposition, and ultimately led to Ireland’s geopolitical sundering.
There is a degree of truth to the statement that Ulsterites are cut from a different cloth
than those in the rest of Ireland. Midway through the Troubles, historians began to take note, and
become more critical of, the population differences between Ulster and Ireland as a whole. R. F.
Foster begins his anthology of modern Irish history with the chapter titled “Varieties of
Irishness,” where he describes what he believes are three early variations of Irishness: the Gaelic
Irish, the native inhabitants of Ireland; the Old English, the descendants of the first AngloNorman colonizers who became Gaelicized over time, termed “the English of Irish birth”; and
the New English, the wealthier, Protestant landowners of various plantation schemes. 4
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In 1998, both English and Irish historians became more critical of the nationalistic
differences between the population in Ireland and Ulster in particular. In Dividing Ireland,
Hennessy argues that ‘Britishness’ - what Unionists in Ulster referred to themselves as - was
composed of multiple imagined communities, and involved building new national identities upon
older ones.5 He considered the British national identity to be over-arching and elastic: it allows
the development of new national identities under the umbrella of British identity, superimposed
on existing cultural identities. So long as one pledged allegiance to the Crown - the head of the
British nation - and put that allegiance above all else, you could form your own individual
national identity within. Hennesssy states, “Britishness did not require the sacrifice of older
national identities.”6 Thus, Ulster Protestants possessed a constantly fluctuating dual national
identity of being Irish beneath their Britishness.
This is what Irish historian David Fitzpatrick in The Two Irelands 1912-1939 claimed led
to a “dual revolution” in Ireland during the Home Rule crisis of 1912-1920.7 Ireland’s desire for
national self-governance caused Ulster Unionists to retaliate as they sought independence from a
presumed Irish Home Rule, leaving each state after partition with a “dual political legacy.” 8 Each
political legacy contains a minority crisis that partition was meant to solve: in the North, the
Catholic minority, wanting to be included in Irish independence, lost having been left out of
Home Rule against their wishes, while in the South, the Protestant minority, wanting to remain
within the Union, lost having been taken out of the Union against their wishes. Both Irish
Nationalists and Ulster Unionists resisted British authority in their own way, simultaneously
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trying to subvert British rule in Ireland.9 Nationalists wanted Home Rule, with or without the sixcounty (Ulster) exclusion, while Unionists would not stand for Home Rule, or at least anything
less than the six-county exclusion in the end.
The province of Ulster developed separately from the three other provinces of Ireland
during the nineteenth century, mainly in that Ulster became heavily industrialized compared to
the agricultural provinces of Leinster, Munster, and Connacht. 10 Industrialization was considered
a mark of civilization by the British, and a key concept in both British imperialism, and what
helped Ulster Protestants identify as British. This led to a stark class division in Ulster, in which
Unionists of all classes successfully banded together using Protestantism, and loyalty to the
Crown, as a socioeconomic adhesive, viewing themselves as a Protestant minority under
Catholic siege, reminiscent of the 1688 Siege of Derry.11 However, the demography somewhat
defies this rhetoric, as the combination of imperialism and industrialization creates something
that is at times difficult to understand. The last Irish census conducted within the British Empire
helps to showcase the complexity of the minority issues Ireland faced during the Home Rule
crisis of 1870-1920.
The 1911 census of Ireland puts the total registered population in Ireland at 4,391,412 of
whom 1,147,579 (26 percent) identified as Protestant, making them a sizable minority
throughout the country. The ‘Protestant stronghold’ of Ulster, however, showed a different
sectarian dichotomy with the total population of 1,581,969 of whom 890,880 (56 percent)
identified as Protestant, making them the majority, albeit slim. In the remaining provinces of
Munster, Leinster, and Connacht, only 256,699 of the total 2,809,443 (9.1 percent) of the
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population identified as Protestant. 12 Protestants in Ulster did not constitute as large a majority as
Catholics did elsewhere in Ireland; and while Protestants could rightfully claim to be a minority
in Ireland, Catholics in Ulster could rightfully claim to be part of the minority as well. This is the
origin of what led to six counties in Ulster remaining within the confines of the United Kingdom,
while the rest of Ireland became a dominion of the British Empire until complete independence
in 1949. Portions of Ulster were already separated - socially, nationalistically, and religiously before the time of partition.
The history of partition is rooted in the parliamentary quest to answer the “Irish
Question” stemming from the Act of Union in 1800. The Act of Union came in response to the
1798 United Irishmen Rebellion, 13 and the larger British issue of pacifying the Celtic fringes of
their Empire’s core. The Act of Union forcibly bound Ireland to the United Kingdom by turning
Ireland into an overseas version of Scotland or Wales. But instead of becoming a full fledged
member of the United Kingdom, Ireland became a lesser, incomplete member with minimal
representation in Westminster. Viewed largely by Irish Catholics as incomplete, the Union
repealed many of the Penal Laws that openly discriminated against Catholics. Catholics could
now seek an education, build their churches with stone, and own a horse worth more than five
pounds, but remained barred from holding any position of political power; those positions were
reserved for the Protestant Ascendency. Along with remedying the complete mismanagement of
Ireland by the British, Catholic parliamentary emancipation, by repealing the Act of Union
became the rallying cry of Irish Nationalists for decades to come.
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Led by Daniel O’Connell,14 the Repeal Movement ultimately sought to recognize the
illegitimacy of the Union, and to find an alternative form of government in Ireland. 15 O’Connell
vehemently opposed violence, striving instead for passive resistance, and used popular politics as
his weapon by invoking the notion of Repeal to rabble-rouse the Irish against the Union. He
ultimately succeeded in this, earning Catholic participation in Westminster, but the vast majority
of the Members of Parliament opposed Repeal viewing the shrinking of the Empire as
preposterous. They brushed O’Connell and his Repeal Movement aside, but O’Connell
continued to use Repeal as a way to push for some form of subordinate Irish parliament. While
O’Connell tried for decades to win enough support for this, Anglo-Irish relations continued to
deteriorate, largely due to Britain's dependency on Irish goods.
Britain depended heavily on Irish agricultural and linen products both prior to, and briefly
following the Union. With the ending of the Napoleonic Wars, European markets reopened and,
with increased industrialization in Britain, came economic upheaval in Ireland. The prices of
Ireland’s main exports plummeted as British demands for Irish goods waned. Britain
subsequently underwent an industrial revolution during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
causing Irish industry in the north to all but disappear as cheap, machine-made products could be
imported from Britain tariff-free as a member of the Union. Exacerbating the economic decline,
Ireland’s population swelled, increasing from a mere half a million in 1745, to more than eight
million in 1845.16 An enormous population, with few jobs available, caused unemployment to
skyrocket, and those with jobs did not fare much better, as wages across Ireland plummeted,
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again thanks to British industrialization. With fewer jobs available, Irish peasants increasingly
moved into the countryside for subsistence farming, mainly becoming tenants on larger,
Protestant-owned plantations.
Most Irish lands had been confiscated from Catholics during the Elizabethan plantation
schemes, and distributed to Scottish and English colonists. The Penal Laws prior to the Union
prevented Catholics from owning property, and while the Union overturned this to an extent,
Irish peasants could not afford to buy or rent lands at reasonable prices. Their small plots of land
only shrank when land was distributed equally among families through inheritance or dowries.
This subdivision of lands contributed to the fact that by the 1840’s, nearly one million land
holdings were smaller than ten acres. 17 Making matters worse, Protestant landlords rarely
reinvested their agricultural profits in their Irish endeavours. Instead, they chose to live
extravagantly abroad, or invest in their more profitable endeavors in South Africa or South
America, and seldom visited their estates in Ireland.
By 1844, conditions in Ireland declined to such an extent that future British Prime
Minister Benjamin Disraeli, during the onset of famine in Ireland, described the “Irish Question”
as it came to be known for the remainder of the nineteenth century:
A dense population, in extreme distress, inhabit an island where there is an
Established Church, which is not their Church, and a territorial aristocracy, the
richest of whom live in foreign capitals. Thus you have a starving population, an
absentee aristocracy, and an alien Church; and in addition the weakest executive
in the world. That is the Irish Question. 18
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Disraeli, himself an older Tory, blamed a new type of “Toryism” for antagonizing Irish
Catholics by perpetuating a political system that promoted Protestantism and excluded Catholics
from positions of power or status, as it had for two centuries. In his speech to the House of
Commons, Disraeli perfectly describes the environment in which violent nationalism ferments.
The Young Irelander Rebellion, staged just four years after Disraeli’s speech, only proved his
point further. Ultimately, the Irish Question boiled down to how the British could handle and
dissipate Irish nationalism, while maintaining social order in Ireland. By the time of Disraeli’s
speech, Unionists in the North were already considering their own solutions to this dilemma.
On 17 October, 1843, the first mention of partition as a solution to the increasingly
complicated Irish Question appeared in an anonymous article published in the Northern Whig in
Belfast. The author outlines notes of a possible petition to the Queen, which calls for the
establishment of a kingdom in Northern Ireland should unrest in Ireland continue. This was in
response to O’Connell’s call for repealing the Act of Union. It claimed the inhabitants of Ulster
are of “a mixed race,” descending from, “Saxons, Danes, [and] Normans,” and are “far more
intimately connected… with people of the neighboring shores in England and Scotland, than they
are with the South and Southwest of Ireland.” 19 The author argues that in the event of repealing
the Act of Union, Ulster should be made into “a separate kingdom, having a separate
legislature,” to in some way maintain its connection with England and Scotland. 20
Between 1845 and 1852, social tensions and nationalism continued to rise as Ireland
suffered a catastrophic blight to the potato crop. With an increased amount of sustenance farming
on nutrient deficient soil prior to the Famine, Irish paupers depended almost entirely on a diet of
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cheap, easy-to-grow potatoes. The failure of a majority of potato crops for multiple years in the
mid-1840s wreaked havoc on the poor, and swollen Irish population. Oddly, throughout the
Famine years no shortage of food actually occurred in Ireland, only a shortage of affordable
food.21 Food became unaffordable to the growing Irish pauper class as food prices and
unemployment rose simultaneously, with those in work earning wages far smaller than those
earned by their forebears.
British policy on dealing with the Famine lay in the laissez faire economic teachings of
Adam Smith. Thus, British legislators, such as Lords Charles Travelyan and John Russell,
actively prohibited any form of government intervention in Irish markets, believing that markets
would sort themselves out. Britain continued to export Irish agricultural goods unabated
throughout the Famine, while the Irish starved, because Britain profited more from selling Irish
food abroad rather than in Ireland. Many Irish historians, including journalist Tim Pat Coogan,
equate the ineffectiveness of British policy on handling the Famine to state sanctioned genocide
of the Irish.22 With more than a million deaths caused by starvation and fever, and another two
million sent overseas via “Coffin Ship”23 transport, Gaelic culture all but disappeared, and the
Irish population has yet to recover to this day. By the end of the Famine, one in three Irish had
left Ireland by either a coffin, or aboard a coffin ship, and the Irish population continued to
decline for the following decades. 24
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The Famine did succeed in cementing an Anglophobic outlook among the Irish, evident
in the Fenian journalist John Mitchel’s apocalyptic rhetoric in remembering the Famine: “the
Almighty, indeed, sent the potato blight, but England sent the famine.” 25 This sort of resentment
was already rooted deeply among Irish nationalist thinking by the time of the Famine, but
Britain's genocidal policies during this period caused irreparable damage to Anglo-Irish
relations, and formed a solid base for Irish resistance in the following decades. It took 150 years
for British authorities to apologize for the atrocities during the Famine, when in 1997, in a step
towards ameliorating Anglo-Irish relations at the tail end of the Troubles, British Prime Minister
Tony Blair issued the first statement of apology for the Famine.
The United Kingdom was the integral core of the British Empire, itself a sort of
preeminent dominion that ruled over the other dominions within the Empire. Ireland’s position
within the core of the British Empire became apparent during the Famine, as Britain steadily
grew wealthier and more powerful, while Ireland descended into disorder and decay. During the
Famine, former British PM Charles (Earl) Grey summarized Ireland's position within the United
Kingdom in a speech made to the House of Lords:
Ireland is the one weak place in the solid fabric of British power—Ireland is the
one deep (I had almost said ineffaceable) blot upon the brightness of British
honour. Ireland is our disgrace. It is the reproach, the standing disgrace, of this
country, that Ireland remains in the condition she is. It is so regarded throughout
the whole civilized world. 26

Grey explained that, even during the early onset of potato blight in Ireland, Britain's response to
the Famine, “is of itself a complete and irrefutable proof of the misgovernment to which she
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[Ireland] has been subjected.”27 The Famine was the nadir of British mismanagement of Ireland,
known as such among prominent political figures during the time. The Tory Party had split
following the repeal of the Corn Laws during the onset of the Famine, Disraeli leading the more
conservative branch, and the remainder merging with the Whigs later on to form the Liberal
Party. Ireland, before and subsequently after the Act of Union, was continually mismanaged: by
1876 the Irish population was in a steady decline, and its wealth so concentrated that fewer than
800 landlords possessed half of the land in the country.28
Irish nationalism struggled to shift towards parliamentary representation for Catholics in
Westminster as violent nationalism rose in the wake of the Famine. The remnants of the
nationalist movements who helped stage the Young Irelander Rebellion in 1848 reformed under
the banner of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), then a secret society formed in 1858. 29
The same year, the Fenian Brotherhood, another secret society, was also founded by Irish
immigrants in the United States who had emigrated during the Famine, with an aim at aiding
Irish nationalism from abroad. 30 Both the IRB and the Fenian Brotherhood dedicated themselves
to fomenting a nationalistic mentality among the Irish, and created a corpus of emotional
writings published in newspapers and novels over the decades. The broader Fenian movement
ultimately promoted a shift towards armed resistance and rebellion, and Fenians staged yet
another abortive rebellion in 1867. For the remainder of the century, some nationalists followed
in O’Connell’s footsteps, dedicating themselves to the nonviolent constitutional struggle, while
others believed in the persuasive means of physical force.
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The alternative to O’Connell’s repeal movement came in the form of what became
known as the Home Rule Movement. Granting Home Rule to Ireland would effectively turn
Ireland into a British dominion outside the core United Kingdom of England, Scotland, and
Wales, but still within the confines of the British Empire, similar to Canada, South Africa, and
Australia.31 O’Connell died in 1847, but not until 1870, when Isaac Butt founded the Home Rule
Association, did Irish nationalists have a solid political outlet to seek political emancipation from
the British. Home Rule - federalizing the United Kingdom by dominionizing Ireland - thus
became thought of as the prominent way to answer the Irish Question.
The idiosyncratic Irish barrister Isaac Butt, himself originally an Orange Tory in party
politics, had a soft spot for Irish nationalism, mainly caused from witnessing such an atrocious
handling of the Famine.32 He went on to found the Home Rule Association in 1870, which is
viewed as the official start of the Home Rule Movement that would last until Ireland’s
partitioning half a century later. Home Rule became the dominant political movement of Irish
Nationalists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Some in Westminster still
thought in O’Connell’s terms of repealing the Union, but leaned more towards Butt’s Home Rule
as the century came to a close.
Butt differed from O’Connell in that he strove for a type of federalization of the United
Kingdom: a local parliament in Dublin subservient to the Imperial parliament in Westminster. 33
Butt was not the first to suggest federalizing the United Kingdom, just its most ardent advocate
for the Irish cause. The first mention of a separate legislation in Ireland came in a response to
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O’Connell’s plea for repeal of the Union in a House of Commons speech by MP Thomas
Macaulay in 1833. Macaulay claimed that, “if the advocates of Repeal wished to separate the
Crowns of England and Ireland… a separation of the Legislatures of the two countries [is
required].”34 Macaulay spoke of federating the United Kingdom, but no minister took him
seriously, claiming two independent legislatures under one executive, “opposed the first
principles of the science of government.”35 This effectively sidelined the repeal movement, and
the anti-federalist argument, in its many forms, hindered Irish independence for the remainder of
the century. But as unrest in Ireland increased as the Famine abated, the prospect of an Ireland
outside the United Kingdom seemed more believable, and this frightened Unionists in the North.
Through the HRA, Butt attempted to attain some semblance of independence for Ireland,
while appealing to Westminster by keeping Ireland in the Empire as a dominion through this
federalist concept. In 1873, the HRA morphed into the Home Rule League, which was more of a
political pressure group than a party, and a year later merged with Irish Nationalists in
Westminster to form the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP), which continued to be led by Butt. 36
However, Butt and his Home Rulers met stiff resistance: in their first action towards achieving
Home Rule three years after the Home Rule Movement began, Butt attempted to form a
parliamentary committee to “consider the present parliamentary relations between Great Britain
and Ireland,” and failed spectacularly in the House of Commons.37 This failure triggered a
restructuring of Irish political leaders, as Butt came to be viewed as unassertive. Charles Stewart
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Parnell replaced him as the leader of the Home Rule Movement by 1877. 38 Parnell brought with
him a more aggressive stance in Westminster with varying degrees of parliamentary
obstructionism, which included filibusters and staging walk-outs. Parnell headed the IPP by 1880
and took a more aggressive stance toward Irish nationalism. He ultimately succeeded in forcing
Liberals and Conservatives to negotiate with his IPP on the Irish Question through these
tactics.39
While Parnell climbed the political ladder to head the IPP, a Liberal government under
the leadership of William Gladstone came to power in Westminster during this time on a ‘justice
for Ireland’ platform, paving the way for collaboration between Irish Home Rulers and British
Liberals. In 1886, Gladstone proposed the first Home Rule Bill, which failed in the House of
Commons by only a slim margin, which showcased the growing support for Irish nationalism. 40
The bill proposed an independent and subordinate Irish parliament, but many Conservatives, as
well as Liberals, saw the bill as flawed. Conservatives such as MP George Goschen argued in
1886 against the bill stating Gladstone had been influenced by the “dark subterranean forces” of
what can only be speculated as Irish Nationalism. 41 Though not opposed to the establishment of a
legislative authority in Ireland to deal exclusively with Irish affairs, then-Liberal MP Joseph
Chamberlain thought the bill to be “very vague and indefinite, and would leave us all a very
large discretion,” and likened the voting on this “dead bill” to a vote of no confidence in the
Liberal government.42
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Gladstone refined the first Home Rule Bill and proposed a second Bill in 1893, which
now contained provisions for a bicameral legislature in Ireland, and the retention of 80 Irish MPs
in Westminster.43 The First Home Rule Bill provided for a unicameral legislature, consisting of
two Orders that could meet either together or separately. 44 This time, with more clarification, the
bill passed in the House of Commons, moving onto the Conservative controlled House of
Lords.45 Once sent to the Lords, the bill failed to gain any political traction, receiving a similar
amount of support to the ideas proposed by Butt during his HRA days.46 The House of Lords was
the greatest opponent to the Home Rule Movement, as its members refused to approve any
semblance of a devolved Irish government, and this prompted action from the Liberals of the
Commons.
The Liberal Party played a large role in Ireland’s Home Rule struggle, and partition later
on. From the beginning of the Home Rule movement, Liberals supported Irish Nationalists
claiming that granting the Irish self-government would strengthen the United Kingdom. Starting
in 1906, Liberals enjoyed such a large majority in the House of Commons that they did not need
to form a coalition government in order to pass bills.47 They further cemented their power in
1908 with the election of Liberal PM Herbert H. Asquith. However, they lost this majority in the
general elections of 1910, which forced them to work with Irish Nationalists to keep a Liberal
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government in power.48 The Liberal Party closely associated itself with the Irish Question,
wanting to grant Home Rule as a way to pacify Ireland, thus strengthening the United Kingdom.
To do so, Liberals would therefore need to fulfil Ireland’s democratic demand for selfgovernment.
In the interim, Nationalist MP John Redmond succeeded Parnell as head of the reunified
IPP in 1900 after a political schism developed over Parnell’s leadership abilities, following his
failure to push through the previous Home Rule Bill. 49 Through Redmond, the IPP maintained
that Ireland should become a dominion within the British Empire, gaining complete control over
domestic affairs. He also believed that granting Ireland dominion status within the British
Empire would foster loyalty for the Crown among the Irish.50 However, this pitted Irish
Unionists against Irish Nationalists in a bid for Home Rule, culminating in a near civil war in
Ireland on the eve of the greatest conflict the world had yet seen. With the third Home Rule Bill
in the works, and preempting the inevitable denial of it from the Lords, the Liberal majority in
the Commons passed, and received the Royal Assent on, the Parliament Act of 1911. This
legislation curtailed the power of the House of Lords, preventing its members from vetoing bills
passed onto them by the Commons no more than three times, ensuring that so long as a bill
passed in the Commons on the fourth try, it would receive the Royal Assent.51 This set the stage
for the introduction of the third Home Rule Bill.
On 11 April 1912, Asquith took up the reins of Gladstone and proposed the third
Government of Ireland Bill.52 Asquith made the Imperial argument that Westminster had too
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many issues to deal with the, “grotesquely impossible task, varying from the infinitely great to
the infinitely small, of which the House of Commons under our present system requires … to be
constantly informed…”53 Making decisions on territories, colonies, and dominions throughout
the Empire became too much for Asquith and the Liberal Party. An overwhelming sense that the
British Empire was growing too big to manage efficiently gripped the Liberals, and they believed
shedding some territory might help solidify the Empire. By restructuring the Empire into
dominions subservient to an imperial parliament, which controls internal trade and foreign
relations, those promoting the federation hoped it would improve imperial defence and trade.
However, the anti-federation argument still held strong in the opposition bench with fears of
undermining the autonomy of colonies, and the perceived inevitability of the collapse of the
Empire.
Tories and Unionists alike maintained that the prerogative power of the crown could not
be delegated to another parliament, without first that very parliament bestowing its sovereignty
to the Crown. The British viewed Ireland as a strategic asset to the Empire’s core, thus
Conservatives in particular used the Irish Question as an example of what could happen to other
(lesser) British holdings around the world. British Conservatives viewed any measure of Home
Rule in Ireland as the breaking up of the United Kingdom which would lead to the disintegration
of the British Empire.54 Tories and Unionists thus aimed to use partition as a political tool in
order to deter Home Rule as they knew Liberals, backed by Irish Nationalists, would never agree
to such terms.
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The Ulster Unionist Party was the most direct representative of the British establishment
in Ireland. Unionists touted their connection with Britain, not only genetically as stated before,
but also in equating the notions of nation and state, believing that the ultimate national goal
should be the inhabitants of Britain and Ireland forming a single nation. 55 They viewed Home
Rule as a direct affront to their broader British-Irish national identity for this reason. Ulster
Unionist MP Ronald McNeill spoke for all Unionists in 1913 when he explained Home Rule to
be “the degradation of their [Unionist] position from being part and parcel of the United
Kingdom... it is that degradation of their position which they resent and which they will not
allow to be perpetrated if they can help it.”56 Unionists combined with the Tories in order to form
the Conservative opposition to Home Rule.
Debate over the third Home Rule Bill gridlocked Westminster, as both Liberals and
Conservatives entrenched themselves in their respective Irish policies; no party would budge on
their proposed compromises. Liberals wanted to grant Home Rule to the entirety of Ireland,
Tories did not. If Home Rule was implemented, Conservatives suggested retaining the province
of Ulster within the United Kingdom, as Protestants who resided there feared life under a Dublin
(Catholic) parliament. Meanwhile, Ulster Unionists prevented Home Rule from moving forward,
while Irish Nationalists would not succumb to the status quo. Finally, on June 11, 1912, Liberal
MP Thomas Agar-Robartes officially proposed an amendment to the Home Rule Bill which
temporarily excluded the four counties of Antrim, Armagh, Down, and Londonderry in Ulster. 57
This catered to Conservative wishes as a way out of the impasse. It also received an
embarrassing amount of support from Liberals, and moved from a question of whether counties
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should be excluded to a question of which counties should be excluded, and for how long the
exclusion should last.58
Agar-Robartes recognized the growing hostility between Nationalists and Unionists in
Ireland, and moved into the camp that believed “Ireland consists of two nations different in
sentiment, character, history, and religion.” 59 This concession enabled the Bill to be passed in the
Commons, sending it to the Lords for the expected third-time rejection, which played out over
the following two years. Debate raged in the meantime, particularly over the number of Ulster
counties to be excluded, ranging from Agar-Robartes’ temporary four county exclusion to a
permanent nine county exclusion proposed by the Conservative House of Lords. 60 The looming
threat of Home Rule’s implementation, in any form, caused tension in Ireland to flare as both
Unionists and Nationalists armed themselves in preparation to fight for their respective goals on
Home Rule.
Paramilitarism in Ireland changed the political landscape of the Home Rule Movement
with the formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Irish National Volunteers (INV).
The looming threat of the passage of the third Home Rule Bill for Protestant Ireland prompted an
armed response in Ulster. In September 1912, Protestants began organizing en mass with the
signing of the “Ulster Covenant,” which received nearly 500,000 signatures, including that of
Unionist Leader MP Edward Carson.61 Fears of discrimination against Protestants in the
proposed Catholic state of an independent Ireland caused Carson to form the UVF in 1913, and
sought to form a provisional government in Ulster should Home Rule be enacted. 62 Initial
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militant supporters of the UVF numbered near 200,000 Ulster Protestants, and in June 1914, a
shipment of 35,000 Mauser rifles and 2.5 million rounds of ammunition landed at Larne,
Donaghadee, and Bangor under the direct supervision of British General Sir William Adair.63 In
response to the formation of the UVF, Redmond formed the INV to help enforce Home Rule
should it be passed. The INV similarly tried to import weapons and ammunition to arm
themselves, but the British Army directly intervened by attempting to seize the arms shipment,
causing 43 Irish casualties in total. 64 Ireland by 1914 was on the verge of a civil war.
Fiery speeches by Unionist MPs fanned the flames of the Protestant fears, and
demonstrations of military drill accompanied by marches of paramilitaries brandishing Mausers
became a regular occurrence in Ulster. The Curragh Camp Incident in early 1914 unequivocally
proved that British forces would not be able to solve the Irish Question. With Home Rule set to
become law later that year, Westminster aimed to use military measures to rein in paramilitarism
in Ireland. But 60 British cavalry officers stationed in Curragh, County Kildare resigned from
their positions rather than follow orders to reinforce British garrisons in Ulster, an order they
believed to be aimed at coercing Ulster into accepting Home Rule. 65 With Ireland on the verge of
civil war, the British Army proved to be ineffective at solving the problem, leaving British
policy-makers to decide Ireland’s fate.
The last desperate attempt at a compromise on the Bill came at the Buckingham Palace
Conference on July 21, 1914 when leaders of all major parties, including Redmond and Carson,
met to settle the Irish Question. The compromise discussed which counties in Ulster would be
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excluded from Home Rule, but not for how long the proposed counties would remain excluded. 66
Redmond utterly rejected this as he strove for a united Ireland without an exclusion, while
Carson insisted that the six counties of Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry, and
Tyrone should be administratively autonomous. 67 Thus, after three days of meeting, the
conference collapsed as no side could agree to a compromise. However, with escalating conflict
in Europe threatening the stability of the Empire, Home Rule for Ireland became contingent on
Britain’s ability to wage international war.
World War One exacerbated the divide between Ulster and the rest of Ireland, prompting
different responses from different political sects in Ireland. Though the war averted, or at least
delayed, conflict between Irish paramilitaries, the war became a political tool for all Irish
factions involved, similar to the way in which British Conservatives used partition during Home
Rule to their advantage. The outbreak of the war proved to be a defining factor on the Irish
political scene, as it put off decision making on Home Rule for a time. Asquith immediately
sidelined it, and the accompanying Amendment Bill, to focus on the growing conflict in
Europe.68 This satisfied neither Nationalists nor Unionists, leaving the ball in the air until further
notice. To complicate matters, Asquith’s cabinet remained divided as to how to approach the
Irish Question: Home Rule could neither remain indefinitely suspended for fear of a Nationalist
response from the INV, nor could Home Rule be implemented for fear of a Unionist response
from the UVF. The delay pitted Unionist and Nationalist factions against each other in a bid for
British favor over Home Rule. Unionists wanted to shelve Home Rule and maintain their union
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with Britain, while the Nationalists sought to implement Home Rule as soon as possible. 69
However, Redmond’s pledge of Nationalist support for the British war effort led to his faction
splitting, further complicating the political battlefield in Ireland.
Redmond advocated for Home Rule and wanted Ireland to attain dominion status within
the British Empire, while Irish Republicans believed that Ireland could not take part in foreign
politics while under what they considered a foreign occupation.70 Republicans unanimously
condemned Redmond’s pledge for Nationalist support once the war broke out. 71 This effectively
split the Nationalist faction into Redmond's followers, on one hand, and the Republican
nationalists of Sinn Féin, on the other. The two differed in that “Redmondites” of the IPP
advocated political nationalism while Sinn Féiners advocated cultural nationalism. Redmondites
wanted to achieve a representative national state that would guarantee uniform citizenship rights
to that state’s members.72
Redmond hoped that by supporting the British in their time of need, Westminster might
grant Ireland Home Rule early. 73 “Whether Home Rule is to have a future will depend on the
extent to which Nationalists… do their part on the firing-line in France.”74 Nationalists saw
support for the war as a precondition to Home Rule, they enlisted in hopes of gaining political
independence. Redmondites feared that a refusal to support the war by Nationalists would turn
British opinion against them and reinforce Unionists’ claims of a damaging Home Rule. Cultural
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nationalists believed that the altruism of Redmond and his IPP was hypocritical. Sinn Féiners
sought the alternative to this by attempting to establish an independent Irish Republic.
Founded in 1906 by Arthur Griffith, Sinn Féin (we ourselves/ourselves alone) advocated
for complete Irish independence, originally on a vague conservative platform of restoring a
native Irish monarchy.75 Sinn Féin came to prominence only after Redmond split the IPP in
1914, acting as a political magnet for many of his erstwhile supporters. Sinn Féin believed that
the glory of a country came from the culture of its people, and with the near disappearance of
Gaelic culture after the Famine, they sought the re-creation of Ireland’s distinctive national
identity; a “moral regeneration of Ireland’s historic community.” 76 To do this, Sinn Féin wanted
nothing less than a completely united and independent Irish republic, free from all forms of
British rule, and ultimately reversing Anglicisation in Ireland by severing all ties with Britain.
Sinn Féin rejected Redmond’s attempts to grant Ireland self-government within the
British Empire, wanting instead to build up Ireland materially and intellectually, and by April
1916 openly claimed its goal to be the establishment of an independent Irish Republic. To
accomplish this, its members focused their political platform on abstention from Westminster
politics, instead attempting to form their own provisional government. 77 Radical nationalists of
Sinn Féin used the four years of hostilities in Europe to prove conclusively the old adage that
‘England’s difficulties are Ireland’s opportunity.’ Radical Nationalists became more vocal about
their disdain of British rule after the outbreak of World War One, and secretly prepared
themselves to secede from the British Empire altogether by fighting from within for their version
of an independent Ireland.
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Asquith eventually decided on a compromise to pass the third Home Rule Bill with an
accompanying Suspensory Bill, which would postpone Home Rule’s implementation until the
end of the European conflict. 78 In September 1914, Asquith presented his compromise to the
House of Commons, and Conservative Leader MP Andrew Bonar Law responded with a
seething speech in opposition, which ended with a Conservative walk-out in protest.79 This left
the decision on passing an amended Home Rule (which included the four-county exclusion, and
a proposal to suspend it until the end of the war) to the Liberals. The bills passed in the
Commons and received Royal Assent through circumvention of the Lords granted by the
Parliament Act. However, this decision backfired because it satisfied neither Unionists nor
Nationalists, and Anglo-Irish relations continued to deteriorate. Though this decision provided
both British parties with a brief respite from the Irish Question, the question was far from
resolved, and Unionists and Nationalists now vied for British favor by contributing to the war
effort.
Recruitment into the British army in Ireland became heavily politicized throughout
World War One. Unionists and Nationalists used their involvement in the war as a means to
achieve their respective political agenda. The Redmond split in the Nationalist party led only to
further politicize the war in Ireland, pitting nationalist against each other as well as Ulster
Unionists. Through their combined efforts, more than 200,000 Irishmen, both Catholic and
Protestant, served in the British Army over the course of the war. 80 While Unionists and
Nationalists competed for British favor over the implementation of Home Rule, Sinn Féin
continued to defy British rule and fight for an independent Irish Republic. Ultimately, whatever
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promise the 1914 Home Rule Bill held went out the window in April 1916 with the Easter Rising
in Dublin.
On 24 April 1916, about 1,500 radical nationalists staged an armed rebellion in Dublin
where they formally declared the formation of an independent Irish Republic ruled by the selfstyled Provisional Government of Ireland. 81 Doomed from the start, the Rising lasted five days
and ended with 16 leaders of the rebellion surrendering. Asquith quickly imposed martial law on
Dublin, and a military court began hastily trying and executing leaders of the rebellion, which
disturbed Liberal MPs in Britain, along with many others abroad. 82 The Rising was not generally
well received at first among the Irish people, many of whom had relatives serving in the British
Army, which Britain used to suppress the Rising. But Britain’s harsh response of executing the
leaders of the Rising is what ultimately turned the sympathies of the Irish toward Sinn Féin,
strengthening the cultural Nationalist cause. This was a double-edged sword however, as the
Rising only strengthened the Unionists’ cries of disloyalty among Irish Nationalists. 83
Britain's response to the Rising further complicated the political battlefield over the Irish
Question as it moved back to the forefront of Parliamentary issues following the Rising. A
rebellious Ireland posed grave danger to the British war effort and an Allied victory in Europe,
so Asquith quickly imposed martial law in Dublin, and appointed Liberal MP David Lloyd
George as Under-Secretary for Ireland to settle the Home Rule issue.84 Lloyd George began
meeting with Irish political leaders at once to rectify the situation. Along with Redmond and
Carson, he agreed to grant Home Rule, with a temporary six-county exclusion, and only on the
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basis of negotiating further.85 Lloyd George assured Carson that Ulster would not be forced into
Home Rule with the rest of Ireland, while Redmond received no reassurance on how temporary
the exclusion would be.86 In the meantime, Redmond’s grasp on the IPP was slipping, and
agreeing to partition Ireland did not work in his favor.
The tumult caused by the Easter Rising essentially forced the IPP to seek terms with the
government to reaffirm its loyalty to the British Crown, and restore calm over Ireland. 87
However, the swift executions of the rebel leaders caused most Irish Nationalists to side with
Sinn Féin, further thinning the ranks of the IPP. With Home Rule teetering in the balance, and its
outlet for support vanishing, the surge in Sinn Féin support threatened the longstanding
relationship in Westminster between Irish Nationalists and British Liberals. In a further blow to
the Liberal Party, Asquith enacted conscription in Britain in 1916, under great pressure from his
opposition, which went against the very principles of voluntary service. 88 Anti-Liberal feelings in
Ireland were compounded by martial law in Ireland following the Easter Rising, and the Liberal
Party began to falter. Asquith lost a vote of confidence in the Commons in October 1916, with
only three-fifths of Liberal MPs voting, though he had the backing of every Unionist MP.89 In
December, Asquith lost the premiership to his Liberal counterpart Lloyd George, who entered
into a coalition with Conservative Leader Andrew Bonar Law, giving Conservatives more
representation in the government.90
With Home Rule still on the sidelines, Lloyd George formed an Irish Convention in mid1917 to assess the Irish Question, and charged it with finding the best form of Irish self-
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government within the greater confines of the Empire.91 The Convention essentially was a
committee in charge of drafting up a new Home Rule Bill, and became a point of contention for
all Irish parties involved; the IPP saw this as their moment for redemption, while Unionists
opposed the convention maintaining that Home Rule should not be implemented, and Sinn Féin
refused to participate altogether, based on their policy of abstention. The largely fruitless
Convention dragged on for eight months, but a renewed German Spring offensive in 1918
shattered any hope of implementing the Convention’s recommendations.
By March of 1918, the German Ludendorff Offensive nearly broke the Allied forces on
the Western Front, and Lloyd George considered implementing conscription in Ireland to
replenish the dwindling ranks of the British 5th Army. Unionists supported this motion touting
their unyielding support for the British Crown, while Redmond, trying to hold the remnants of
his party together, argued that the only way to conscript the Irish would be as a condition for
granting Home Rule.92 Thus, the Irish Question was complicated further as it turned to the
question of mandatory military service in Ireland: Liberals and Nationalists wanted Home Rule
without conscription, while Conservatives and Unionists wanted conscription without Home
Rule.
It is difficult to say how beneficial conscripting the Irish into the British Army would be
in early 1918 given the state of open rebellion in Ireland, but estimates at the time anticipated
150,000 recruits could be secured. 93 Lloyd George, more concerned with winning the war in
France than the resulting disturbances in Ireland, enacted conscription in Ireland without Home
Rule on March 26, acting on the advice of his War Cabinet. 94 This action went against the
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counsel of every Irish advisor Lloyd George had discussed it with, including the Chief Secretary
of Ireland H. E. Duke, who told him bluntly “we might almost as well recruit Germans.” 95
Attempting to conscript the Irish at the point of a bayonet only proved to work against the British
by further bolstering the ranks of Sinn Féin, which used this opportunity to further its own
political agenda.
Lloyd George sent the former British Expeditionary Force commander Lord John French
to oversee conscription in Ireland with military force, and within days of his arrival he suggested
that he might need to impose martial law over the entire country. 96 Catholic clergymen and Sinn
Féiners preached open rebellion in the following months, which culminated with the arrest and
deportation of 73 Sinn Féiners in May under the charge of plotting with Germany against
Britain.97 Once the tide of the war in Europe began to shift in favor of the Allies in June,
Westminster abandoned conscripting the Irish, and the war ended a few months later.
By the end of the war in Europe, two Liberal PMs had proved unable to deliver on the
promise of Irish Home Rule. Liberal Party leaders could not claim to support even their own
values anymore, having enacted conscription in Britain and Ireland. Irish Home Rule continued
to be a thorn in the Liberals side, which led to the demise of the Liberal Party.98 At the outset of
World War One, Home Rule was a uniting factor within the Liberal Party for decades: all
Liberals could agree on the principle of Home Rule, but by the end of World War One they all
varied in its implementation over the complexities caused by the Easter Rising, imposed martial
law, and a conscription crisis in Ireland.
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The IPP all but disappeared in December 1918 when Sinn Féin seized landslide electoral
victories across Ireland in the first (and last) all-Ireland election.99 Redmond had died earlier in
1918, and the IPP failed to replace him with a competent leader. This resulted in Sinn Féin
gaining support as the main Irish Nationalist party, with the only surviving leader from the Easter
Rising, Eamon De Valera, as their newly elected president. 100 The IPP almost ceased to exist
overnight, retaining only six of its original 80 seats in Westminster; out of the 105 seats possible
for Irish MPs, Sinn Féin filled 73 of them, including the first woman elected to British
Parliament, Constance Markievicz. 101 Likewise, Liberal parliamentary power significantly
diminished after this election, but party members maintained that the Irish Question could be
resolved indefinitely with the implementation of the third Home Rule Bill. 102 Very few Irish
Nationalists remained in Westminster, so Liberals could not hope to have any real swaying
power; instead they formed a coalition with Conservatives to form a government. 103 By this time,
Irish nationalism had progressed significantly past old ideas of “dominion” Home Rule: it was on
to complete independence. Sinn Féin ran on its platform of Westminster abstentionism, and after
their victory in 1918 it practiced what it preached.
The elected Sinn Féiners refused to sit in Westminster, instead moving to form their own
unicameral parliament, Dáil Éireann (Assembly of Ireland) in Dublin on January 21, 1919. 104
This occurred on the same day as the Soloheadbeg Ambush, in County Tipperary, in which a
column of IRA volunteers ambushed a contingent of Royal Irish Constabulary officers, killing
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two of them.105 Britain viewed these tandem actions as a casus belli, and responded by making
all of South Tipperary a militarized zone, and declared the assembly of Dáil Éireann illegal. 106
Anglo-Irish relations deteriorated to a new low with the outbreak of the Anglo-Irish War that
followed, pitting the infantile Republic of Ireland against the post-war British Empire. Now in
the midst of widespread open rebellion in Ireland, Westminster continued to seek an answer to
the Irish Question with the drastically altered political playing field.
The British Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) rose to prominence following the decline
of the Liberal Party post-war, and became the main opposition to the Conservatives. The PLP
promised “the fullest measure of Home Rule inside a federated United Kingdom” in their 1918
manifesto.107 At the end of 1918, three options existed for Britain regarding the Irish Question:
implement the suspended 1914 Home Rule Bill with the four-county exclusion, repeal the 1914
Home Rule Bill indefinitely, or supersede it with new legislation. Lloyd George decided on the
latter option, and appointed Unionist MP Walter Long as chairman to a new committee intent on
finding a settlement to which Conservatives would agree.108
In late 1919, the committee agreed to the necessity of two separate parliaments in Ireland,
answerable to an all-Ireland Federal Council, and whose power would be delegated to by the two
parliaments.109 These two parliaments would effectively administer Home Rule separately to
their respective jurisdictions, with the new Federal Council to help oversee partition. The fourth
Home Rule Bill, drafted in 1920 based on this committee's findings, provided for this dual Home
Rule option in order to satisfy all parties left involved: the remaining Nationalists would be
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granted dominion Home Rule, Ulster would have Protestant representation in Ireland, and Britain
would not coerce Ulster into Home Rule. However, the committee suggested that all nine
counties of Ulster be excluded from Home Rule with the explicit aim of eventually unifying
North and South.110 Unionists, reluctantly accepting the separation of Ulster, opted instead for
excluding only the six counties they knew they could control with a Protestant majority, hoping
they could remain outside of the Home Rule dominion indefinitely if they kept the majority.
The newest installment of the Home Rule Movement received flak from many MPs,
mainly because it did not fundamentally answer the Irish Question. Labour MP John R. Clynes
claimed the new bill would not generate unity or convince the (now openly rebellious) Irish to be
loyal British subjects. “We ought, therefore, not to deceive ourselves with the thought that any
such measure imposed on Ireland and forced by this superior Parliament will allay that patriotic
demand or settle this century-old claim.”111 Using this argument, the entire PLP abstained from
voting, along with the entire Opposition, believing it to be fundamentally flawed.112 Catering to
the remaining Irish MPs in Westminster, the new committee on Ireland gave Unionists the six
counties that had Protestant majorities, a decision more in line with the sectarian geography. 113
Unionists did not want to control areas with high numbers of Nationalists fearing that, in time,
they may grow to outnumber Unionists in the region, leading to eventual unity with the South.
The fourth Home Rule Bill received Royal Assent in December 1920. It passed, as had its
predecessor, with all those opposed to it abstaining. However, Home Rule never went into effect
in southern Ireland due to the ongoing Anglo-Irish War.
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Anglo-Irish antipathies raged on for more than a year of brutal guerilla warfare, and
though casualties were relatively low, terror and atrocities gripped Ireland for the duration of the
conflict. An event that epitomizes the brutality of the war occurred on ‘Bloody Sunday,’
November 21, 1920, in which IRA strategist Michael Collins helped conduct a large-scale
assassination, which unintentionally provoked a British overreaction. Collins and his ‘Twelve
Apostles’ hit squad, reinforced by elements of the Dublin IRA Brigade, conducted a massive
synchronized retaliatory strike against the entire British Secret Service operation in Ireland. In a
matter of minutes, Collins and his men assassinated all 16 of the British Secret Service
leadership, effectively crippling their intelligence network in Ireland. The British responded in
kind later that day when Black and Tans, Britain's auxiliary military police, drove an armored
personnel carrier onto the pitch of a Dublin Gaelic Athletic Association Gaelic football match at
Croke Park, and began firing into the crowd, killing 14 and wounding hundreds.114 This sort of
bloody tit-for-tat warfare wreaked havoc on the Irish population, both North and South, officially
until mid-1921, and unofficially well into the 1970s.
Irish and British forces agreed to a ceasefire in July 1921, and started the long peace
treaty talks that officially brought about the end of hostilities. Republicans knew the stakes, and
would not stand for anything less than a united independent Ireland outside of the British
Empire. De Valera appointed Collins to be one of the Treaty negotiators, and over months of
negotiations, Collins made countless trips to London, negotiating with some of Britain's most
influential politicians.115 After long stressful months of negotiations, Collins and his fellow
delegates, well informed on the terms of the Treaty, signed it as plenipotentiaries to the Dáil on
December 6, 1921.
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The Treaty merely forced Irish Republicans into administering the fourth Home Rule Bill
as enacted by the British the previous year, the only alteration was that the Provisional
Republican government in Dublin could stay in power, and transition over to the dominion
government.116 It reinforced the six-county partition, and granted Northern Ireland one month to
decide whether to opt in or out of the dominion Home Rule with the South.117 This essentially
charged both Irish parties to figure out Home Rule and border creation on their own. Collins
knew this, but dominion status was the best he and other delegates could hope for. He also knew
that returning with these terms would be perceived as a betrayal to the Republican cause. 118 This
ideological betrayal would at best mean ruthless political in-fighting among Irish Republicans
and former Nationalists, at its worst Collins suspected, “I may have signed my actual deathwarrant.”119 He could not have been more prescient. Collins died in an Anti-Treaty IRA ambush
in the Irish Civil War that followed the Treaty signing.
The day after Collins signed the treaty the Dáil debated and approved the treaty by a slim
margin of seven votes. 120 Two days later, De Valera resigned as President of Sinn Féin, and led
the Anti-Treaty camp in walking out of an emotional, tear-filled Dáil, and the Provisional
Government split.121 With many IRA officers as Teachtaí Dála (Assembly Delegates) in the
newly formed Dáil, the political split in the Dáil over the Treaty replicated itself in the military.
De Valera traveled the country giving speeches to large crowds expressing his disapproval of the
Treaty, enticing the “volunteers of the past four years [Irish Republicans]” to continue fighting
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for the Republic, even if it meant wading “through the blood of some of the members of the
Government in order to get Irish freedom.”122 Civil war between the Pro-Treaty and the AntiTreaty camps soon followed as the Pro-Treatyites began working with Britain on implementing
dominion Home Rule.
Much of the controversy over the signing of the Treaty stemmed from Article 12, which
established a Boundary Commission that would determine the future border between the North
and South of Ireland.123 Through this Commission, Irish signatories believed that they could win
back the North by mobilizing the Nationalist majority there. 124 This ideology is exactly what
worried Unionists, and while it was meant to be the coda of the Irish Question, the Commission
proved horribly ineffective at settling the border issue. The Commission originally intended
initiating a province-wide plebiscite to determine sectarian lines in Ulster, but backtracked on
this, instead reverting to the outdated 1911 Census of Ireland. 125 Article 12 provided no timetable
for the Commission to make a decision, which further stoked the fears among border
communities where sectarian violence increased. Northern Irish historian Robert Lynch
examined the violent after-effects of the proposed, then delayed border implementation:
Between 13 and 15 February [1922], thirty-one people were killed in Belfast,
including six children after a bomb had been thrown into their school yard. The
following month, the death toll reached unprecedented levels, principally due to
the active participation of paramilitaries and new state police forces in the
violence. In March… masked policemen [shot] six male members of the Catholic
MacMahon household in their North Belfast home. The IRA would respond…
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throwing bombs onto trams packed with Protestant shipyard workers, and…
executing Protestant civilians lined up outside their burning homes. 126

The Northern counties and surrounding border counties experienced ebbs and flows of
this sectarian violence for the remainder of the twentieth century. The Commission failed
to resolve the border issue, and failed to stem the sectarian violence which followed.
The Commission was composed of one delegate from each of the newly formed
governments in the North and South, headed by a chairman appointed by the British
government.127 The Irish Free State appointed its education minister, Eoin MacNeill, as its
representative to the Commission after the Civil War ended in 1923. 128 Britain appointed Richard
Feetham, a member of the South African Supreme Court, as chairman of the Commission, and
who was regarded as a neutral pick. 129 However, Feetham later in the negotiations unequivocally
ruled out the counties Tyrone and Fermanagh from joining the Free State. 130 Compounding this,
the government in the North refused outright to participate in both the all-Ireland Council (per
Government of Ireland Act, 1920), and the Boundary Commission, leaving Britain to appoint a
representative for it.131 The British chose a Unionist, ex-Belfast newspaper editor Joseph Fisher,
to represent Northern Ireland, and the Commission finally met for the first time on October 24,
1924.132
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Outnumbered by the British 2-1 on the Commission, MacNeill attempted to work with
them on a viable solution that would satisfy both parties involved. But a leaked document from
the Commission, published in the Conservative Morning Post in Belfast, detailed the partition as
largely unchanged from its establishment by the fourth Home Rule Bill. 133 This outraged
MacNeill as the Commissioners were sworn to secrecy over partition, and he brought the
document leak up at a Commission meeting in Dublin on November 21, 1925, where the other
members down played it, or outright denied it. 134 This leak effectively sealed the Commission's
fate, as MacNeill resigned from both the Commission and the Dáil soon thereafter, leaving the
Conservative Commissioners to do as they pleased with the border. 135 The Boundary
Commission succeeded only in wasting time, and further damaging Anglo-Irish relations. The
(Free State-less) Commission established the border through the fourth Home Rule Bill, largely
unchanged, and as it stands today.
By the end of 1925 an unsettling peace descended over Ireland in regards to partition, and
both sides participated in a collective forgetting, during which neither side reconciled with the
other. Those who refused to forget proceeded to construct a national narrative of revolutionary
atonement in the South and patriotic resistance in the North, and succeeded in sporadically
terrorizing border communities on either side of the partition. Partition utterly failed to resolve
antagonisms between Nationalists and Unionists, leaving all parties involved more or less
dissatisfied in the end.
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Anglo-Irish relations have been strained since they began, and antipathies between
Ireland and Britain, Catholics and Protestants, run deeper than could be chronicled here.
Understanding Ireland’s history, both under the oversight of the British Empire, and briefly as an
Independent Irish Republic, leading to the establishment of the Irish partition, helps to explain
the course of Anglo-Irish relations. As a result of British mismanagement in Ireland, Irish
Nationalists pursued various versions of self governance, through both peaceful and violent
means over the course of a century.
The struggle for repealing the Act of Union and subsequent Home Rule movement
illustrate why Anglo-Irish relations deteriorated over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, and help to explain why relations continue to be strained over the course of current
events, with the new-age Irish Question in the context of Brexit. Northern Ireland may be forced
to reluctantly follow suit with whatever Britain decides on Brexit, just as Unionists reluctantly
accepted partition as a condition to Home Rule, and let Britain decide the border for them.
The Irish Question plagued Westminster for decades, mutating like a virus with every
new host of uncertainties brought upon by the threat of civil war in 1914, the outbreak of
international war, or rebellious uprisings. British Conservatives first used partition as a deterrent
for granting Ireland dominion status within the British Empire, attempting to preserve the
Empire’s holdings in fear of weakening the Empire. Their Liberal counterparts, originally
appalled at the idea of partition, reluctantly accepted the idea in order to grant at least part of
Ireland dominion status later on. It provided for the longstanding Liberal Party a fall from grace,
and brought to the center stage the most prominent Irish political party to exist within the British
Empire, and beyond.
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Meaningful legislation on Ireland only passed in Westminster when large portions of the
opposition abstained, leaving the majority to do as they pleased with decisions on Ireland, such
as the Conservatives walking out on the Home Rule Bill in 1912, and Labour walking out on the
Home Rule Bill in 1920. In contrast, partition was established without any democratic
considerations, just as Northern Ireland may be forced to leave the EU in 2021 after having
democratically voted to remain within it. While partisan violence waned in the years following
the Good Friday Agreement, since the 2016 Brexit referendum there has been a steady increase
in uncertainty over the border. The history of partition provides a guide on how to ameliorate
Anglo-Irish relations going forward with the current border issue, or at least how not to strain
them further. For democracy to prevail in Ireland, legislators must be beholden to the democratic
demands of the population, instead of turning a blind eye in an attempt at holding on to the
remnants of an oppressive power structure. Northern Ireland's future seems uncertain as the
border, 100 years later, continues to be a point of contention, straining Anglo-Irish relations
before, during, and after the implementation of the partition of Ireland.
Partition was established as a British border on the island of Ireland, but we must
remember that today the border belongs as much to the South as it does to the North, and I think
the South are emphatic about the British border being at the beach. The Good Friday Agreement,
signed by all three parties, states that Northern Ireland cannot change its constitutional status
without a direct say from the people. The people, or at least those who voted, spoke in 2016
when about 56 percent of the Northern Irish voted to remain in the EU, but this seems not to
matter as they are still being taken out of the EU with Britain who essentially decided for them.
Because of this, it seems Northern Ireland is not leaving the EU, but is being taken out of it. This
is in direct conflict with the Good Friday Agreement, and could very well lead to bitter
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contestation down the road. There will always be someone upset by either decision on the
border, and if it's not the IRA it will be the UVF, evident now with the increase in partisan
violence as of late. Ultimately, the EU would offer an institutional structure that would make it
possible to end partition in a manner that would satisfy both sides in the North and South, and
hopefully soon.
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